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Abstract: 
Differential games combine strategic interactions between agents and optimization concerning 
time. Decisions made in the past determine the present and even the future –in pay off as well 
as in the opportunities available – for oneself and for the rival players, eventually too. Un-
fortunately, due to high complexity it is hard to find a Nash-equilibrium within a differential 
game and it is even harder to get some results in comparative statics.  
It is the purpose of the paper at hand to present findings concerning comparative statics in a 
differential game discussed by Wacker and Blank (1999). Comparative statics become 
available due to a routine solving for the open-loop Nash equilibrium for each parameter 
combination under consideration. A description of the routine – a 4 step simulation run which 
approximates the equilibrium numerically – was presented in an earlier Working Paper. In the 
earlier Paper Excel was applied as it is a wild spread tool. Here again Excel, its Solver and 
Macros constitute the main instruments; they are used to get repeated simulation runs for 
varying parameter constellations. The findings presented here concern varying allocations in 
initial stocks. Generalization to comparative statics in further parameters is in progress.
♣  
 
                                                 
♣ JEL-classification: A22, C73, Q30 
  21 Introduction 
More and more, spreadsheet tools like Excel are in use to enable middlebrows to rebuild 
ecological and economical models. The tools ease the understanding of interdependencies 
between time and variables related to each other. Thus, the solution of differential games may 
become an additional domain for tools like Excel. In the paper at hand, a model from resource 
economics is linchpin for demonstration.  
 
The literature about software support in resource management is multiform nowadays. The 
early literature in the seventies mainly concentrated on tools used in system dynamics.
1 But 
with the diffusion of spreadsheet tools like Excel, more and more literature on modelling 
decisions and forecasts with the help of spreadsheets arose. 
Literature explaining how to utilize spreadsheet tools to acquire a deeper understanding of 
decision analysis, biology and economics includes for instance Papadatos et al. (2002), 
Ragsdale (2001), Conrad (1999), Buongiorno and Gilles (2003) and Kirschke and 
Jechlitschka (2002).  
One early publication on computation of optimal harvesting strategies is Kolberg (1993), who 
investigates renewable resource management, especially steady states, in a competitive 
industry. The author analyses backward and forward induction (Bellman Principle of Opti-
mality
2) and compares them to classical linear quadratic dynamic programming. The output is 
generated via a Quattro Pro program.  
Conrad (1999) employs Excel within resource economics. Special emphasis is given to 
fishery- and forestry models, as these topics are the most common one in renewable resource 
                                                 
1 Examples for system dynamic tools are Dynamo, SIMPAS, DynSim, VenSim and PowerSim or Stella; 
concerning history and features of the software see Gilbert and Troitzsch (1999), chapter 3. These tools allow the 
definition of stocks and flows, to control feedback effects, and so on. They ease forecasting the development of 
variables linked through a system of differential equations.  
2 Bellmann equations handle a value function; they induce the same necessary conditions for optimality as the 
Maximum Principle of Pontryagin. For further explamations see: Intriligator (1971), chapter 13, or Fernández-
Cara and Zuazua (0000), appendix 2. 
  3economics. Further issues are depletable resources, like in the paper at hand, and pollution. 
Last but not least, option values in resource economics and sustainable development are 
analysed. In contrast to the present paper, in Conrad (1999) chapter 5, the market for the 
exhaustible resource is in perfect competition. Thus, the suppliers behave like price takers, 
unaware of any influence on the resource price. Therefore, there is not interaction between 
suppliers and the optimization problem is of a usual control theoretic type.  
Ragsdale (2001), too, deals with Excel. In contrast to Conrad, Ragsdale concentrates on 
typical business and organisation problems, when applying Excel to Decision Analysis, 
Linear Programming, Forecasting and Queuing Problems. Optimization problems are mostly 
solved through the usual Solver. In special cases the Premium Solver (enhanced version of the 
usual Excel Solver) is in use.  
Papadatos et al. (2002) give an example on how to apply Excel and Access to optimize net 
revenue through an appropriate product mix of cheese categories and other milk merchandise. 
Access is utilized as user interface. The optimization runs through the Premium Solver in 
Excel with an adjusted option setting for their nonlinear optimization problem.  
Another example for an Excel application in decision analysis is Kirschke and Jechlitschka 
(2002), who present an introduction into worksheet design to model governmental inter-
ventions in agricultural markets. They integrate both, foreign markets and multi product 
situations, when solving for optimal tax and subvention rates or optimizing the budget 
allocation on different programs for structural/rural development. In contrast to Papadatos et 
al. (2002) they work with the usual Excel Solver and refer to the Premium Solver only for 
extended models including 12 product markets at once. 
Buongiorno and Gilles (2003) deal with Forest management; they employ Excel and the usual 
Excel Solver for silvicultural decisions. Forest management is a field strongly influenced 
through long time decisions. A profound knowledge of the mayor effects current decisions 
have on future opportunities is indispensable. Furthermore, proper forecasts in margins should 
  4be available, and last but not least, the risks intrinsic in silviculture are enormous, thus risk 
management becomes essential. Buongiorno and Gilles (2003) explain how to deal with all 
these aspects, and in elucidating the design of the spreadsheets they take into account con-
straints through environmental policy, biodiversity requirements, and integer variables. 
Besides, they provide a comprehensive reference list for their work. But strategic thoughts on 
competitors’ behaviour are missing. Insofar, their spreadsheet design is not adequate for an 
expansion to differential games. 
 
Differential games combine game theoretic and dynamic aspects. Their advantage is due to 
the fact that most opportunities depend on past decisions – not only on ones own past 
decisions but on competitors’ actions, too; thus it is not necessary to abstract reality beyond 
justifiable limits. The handicap of differential games is due the identification of equilibria and 
their features.  
The paper presents some findings on comparative statics concerning the open-loop Nash 
equilibrium of the oligopolistic resource market described in Wacker & Blank (1999). The 
results are of numerical type and the reader can reproduce them without a profound 
knowledge in control theory or game theory. 
 
The subsequent part summarizes the layout of the Excel file employed to find the open-loop 
Nash equilibrium
3 of the 3-player-game, investigated by Wacker and Blank (1999). An 
extended explanation of the worksheet design and the solution routine is given in an earlier 
Working Paper.  
Then, chapter 3 presents some findings in comparative statics. The findings concern varying 
allocations in initial stocks. Finally opportunities for further research are discussed. 
                                                 
3. An open-loop Nash equilibrium is a strategy combination, where each player commits to his strategy at the 
beginning of the game, i.e. no one updates his decision during the course of the game. See Dockner et al. (2000), 
p. 59 for further discussion.  
  5 
2 Model and Excel worksheet design 
In the 3-player differential game under consideration each player owns a given initial stock 
,  , of an exhaustible resource. Extraction causes costs, proportional to the 
extracted quantity, i.e. marginal and average extraction costs are identical, time-invariant, and 
independent from residual stock size; they amount  . 
i S
0 3 , 2 , 1 = i
i c
Players face a time-invariant linear demand curve expressed through a willingness to pay for 
the total period output  ,  t R t t R b a R p ⋅ − = ) ( , which is the sum of all players’ output. The 
market is oligopolistic; players seek to maximize their individual total discounted profit 
taking into account the extraction paths of both competitors. Thus, the ‘outcome’ is an open-
loop Nash equilibrium. But unfortunately, it is not possible to find a general analytical 
solution for this differential game, thus numerical solutions are in focus. 
When looking for numerical solutions, it is advisable to check for their quality. In the model 
at hand this task is done through a look at the Euler-Equation.
4 The Euler-Equation states the 
identity of marginal discounted profits in all periods with non-diminishing extraction – in case 
each pay-off meets its optimum.
5  
 
With Excel and its Solver one can reconstruct the open-loop Nash equilibrium – i.e. the 
extraction paths – given at certain parameter constellation. Therefore, the qualitative findings 
presented in Wacker and Blank can be precised quantitatively.  
Wacker and Blank choose the following parameter constellation for different initial stocks: 
150 ; 500 ; 50 ; 3 , 2 , 1 % 6 2 ; 5 ; 80 3 2 1
0 0 0 = = = = = = = = S S S i for and c b a i i δ  
6 
                                                 
4  For a discussion of evaluation techniques in numerical methods, see Judd (1999), Chapter 2.10 
5 See for example: Sydsæter, Strøm, Berck (2000) Chapter 16. 
6  Notice that we changed index two and three.  
  6Inserting these parameters into the worksheet and running the routine provides the extraction 
paths presented in the following picture:  

































Picture 1: total extraction and it’s split between players 
 
The following table displays the design of the worksheet used to reproduce the example with 
different initial stocks. The upper part, precisely A1:B9, contains all parameter values; to 
make formulas in the middle part more readable, cells are renamed: 
B1 ≡ a; B2 ≡ b; B3 ≡ r; B4 ≡ c_1 ¸B5 ≡ c_2 B6 ≡ c_3; B7 ≡ S_01; B8 ≡ S_02 ; B9 ≡ S_03 
A11:K14 from the middle part display the first four rows of the area used to reproduce the 
extraction paths. These rows content period index, price, extraction quantities x1, x2 and x3, 
non-discounted profits Π1, Π2, and Π3 and discounted profits, and these rows represent just 
the first four periods; it is omitted to fill up the table with all other rows of the original Excel 
worksheet, as they follow simply by copy and paste.  
  7A  B  C  D  E  F  G  H  I  J  K 
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t p x1 x2 x3 Π1 2 3  disc. Π1 disc. Π2 disc. Π3 
1 a-b*(C11+D11+E11) 0,5 1,5 5 (B11-c_1)*C11 (B11-c_2)*D11 (B11-c_3)*E11 ((1/(1+r))^A11)*F11 ((1/(1+r))^A11)*G11 ((1/(1+r))^A11)*H11 
2                   
                   
                   
                    
                    
           
           
           
                   
           
a-b*(C12+D12+E12) 0,5 1,5 5 (B12-c_1)*C12 (B12-c_2)*D12 (B12-c_3)*E12 ((1/(1+r))^A12)*F12 ((1/(1+r))^A12)*G12 ((1/(1+r))^A12)*H12 
3 a-b*(C13+D13+E13) 0,5 1,5 5 (B13-c_1)*C13 (B13-c_2)*D13 (B13-c_3)*E13 ((1/(1+r))^A13)*F13 ((1/(1+r))^A13)*G13 ((1/(1+r))^A13)*H13 
4 a-b*(C14+D14+E14) 0,5 1,5 5 (B14-c_1)*C14 (B14-c_2)*D14 (B14-c_3)*E14 ((1/(1+r))^A14)*F14 ((1/(1+r))^A14)*G14 ((1/(1+r))^A14)*H14 
…
…
98  a-b*(C108+D108+E108)  0,5 1,5 5 (B108-c_1)*C108  (B108-c_2)*D108 (B108-c_3)*E108 ((1/(1+r))^A108)*F108 ((1/(1+r))^A108)*G108 ((1/(1+r))^A108)*H108 
99  a-b*(C109+D109+E109)  0,5 1,5 5 (B109-c_1)*C109  (B109-c_2)*D109 (B109-c_3)*E109 ((1/(1+r))^A109)*F109 ((1/(1+r))^A109)*G109 ((1/(1+r))^A109)*H109 






(E11:E110) SUMME(I11:I110)  SUMME(J11:J110) SUMME(K11:K110)
Table 1: design of calculation worksheet 
  8 The lower part of table 1 contains just the last three periods and sum-formulas: in C112, D112 
and E112 the sums of individual extraction quantities, in I112, J112, and K112 the sums of 
the discounted profits, i.e. the optimization targets. 
Parts of the initial extraction paths with a uniform distribution of the initial stocks over a time 
horizon of 100 periods are displayed in table 1. Although, this is surely not a good initial 
guess, it allows reproducing the Nash equilibrium through 4 simulation runs. 
 
Rotational optimization of discounted profits in 4 simulation runs provides approximations 
acceptable as depletion paths
7 and represented through picture 1. For more details
8, see the 
earlier Working Paper. 
The functioning of the tatonement process relates greatly on the initial guess concerning 
extraction paths. In case of a bad choice, the algorithm might get stuck. Fortunately, jittering 
curves identify usually suboptimal extraction paths. In addition, a look at the Euler equations 
displays a problem for one or more players. In such a case it may be helpful to choose a 
related parameter constellation, run the algorithm, and apply the result as initial guess for the 
original problem.
9 For more details, see the earlier Paper. 
 
3 Comparative statics on initial stock allocation 
The automation of simulation runs by Macros eases the work on comparative statics. For 
example it allows analysing how the allocation of initial stocks
10 influences the distribution of 
discounted profits. 
                                                 
7 A check of the Euler-Equation provides information about convergence of the tatonement process. For 
additional details see the earlier Paper. 
8 To account for the non-linearity, the check mark for ‘assume linear’8  is deactivated and ‘quadratic’ instead of 
‘linear’ as ‘estimates’ option8 is chosen. Further, the presetting of ‘max time’8 and ‘iterations’ are both 
increased by factor 5.  
9  For detailed description, see Judd (1999), p. 119 concerning ‘hot starts’. Further a rearrangement of 
optimization sequence between players may be helpful; Judd (1999), p.71.  
10 To recall, in chapter 3 the allocation under consideration was  .  150 ; 500 ; 50 3 2 1
0 0 0 = = = S S S
  9To guarantee some comparability, allocations with equal total initial stock volume are chosen, 
to be precise with a total initial volume of 600 units. Ten different allocations are analysed, 
see table 2 for details: 
allocation_ID S_01  S_02  S_03 
1 200  200  200 
2 180  190  230 
3 160  180  260 
4 140  170  290 
5 120  160  320 
6 100  150  350 
7 80  140  380 
8 60  130  410 
9 40  120  440 
10 20 110  470 
Table 2: the 10 settings for allocation of initial  
stocks 
 
The setting concerning the demand parameters, extraction costs and interest rate is as follows:  
3 , 2 , 1 % 6 5 ; 5 ; 80 = = = = = i for and c b a i i δ  
I.e., the only difference between players is in initial stock size. Beginning with an identical 
situation of all players, stepwise player 1 owns 20 units less in S_01 and player 2 owns 10 
units less in S_02. Accordingly, with each step player 3 gets 30 units more than before. 
Given the allocation of initial stocks, some type of initial ‘competitiveness’ of the market can 
be expressed by a Herfindahl index, using size of initial stocks instead of sales volume (ai), 
which is the usual input in the formula.
11 
12 
                                                 
11 The Herfindahl index usually expresses the concentration in a delimited market during a delimited period. For 
a uniform distribution of market shares, the index corresponds to 1/N, with N as the number of firms. In case of a 
monopoly, the index degenerates to its limit value 1. Alternative measures are the concentration ratios CR1, CR3 
or CR4 and the Lerner index.  




























Where helpful, shares in initial stock size are employed as well. 
The following table 3 displays the Herfindahl index and the share in initial stock size related 
to the allocations above, and pictures 6 and 7 summarize the settings graphically: 
 
allocation_ID  Herfindahl_Index_S_0 Share_1 Share_2 Share_3 
1 33%  33% 33% 33% 
2 34%  30% 32% 38% 
3 35%  27% 30% 43% 
4 37%  23% 28% 48% 
5 40%  20% 27% 53% 
6 43%  17% 25% 58% 
7 47%  13% 23% 63% 
8 52%  10% 22% 68% 
9 58%  7% 20%  73% 
10 65%  3% 18%  78% 
Table 3: concentration and shares in initial stock volume 
























Picture 6: shares in initial stock volume 
  11 





















Picture 7: concentration 
For each allocation a 4-step simulation run was initiated and for each player his discounted 
total profit as well as the period he leaves the market was documented. Further continuously, 
minimum and maximum discounted marginal profits are compared to check the quality of 
each particular simulation result.  




















































































































































1  1363,17 1363,17 1363,17  1,40  1,40 1,40 1,40 1,40 1,40 68 68 68 200  200 200
2  1311,92 1340,30 1443,22  1,60  1,50 1,30 1,60 1,50 1,30 63 65 70 180  190 230
3  1162,80 1219,86 1403,58  1,50  1,40 1,00 1,50 1,40 1,00 59 63 74 160  180 260
4  1109,05 1209,25 1495,63  1,90  1,50 0,90 1,90 1,50 0,90 54 60 76 140  170 290
5  1045,59 1204,06 1603,89  2,30  1,70 0,80 2,30 1,70 0,80 48 56 78 120  160 320
6  968,02 1205,19 1732,91  2,9  2,0 0,7 2,9 2,0 0,7 42 53 80 100  150 350
7  870,26 1214,39 1888,07  3,9  2,3 0,6 3,9 2,3 0,6 36 50 82 80  140 380
8  744,08 1234,11 2076,98  5,3  2,8 0,5 5,3 2,8 0,5 30 46 84 60  130 410
9  577,19 1268,59 2309,31  7,5  3,3 0,5 7,5 3,3 0,5 23 42 86 40  120 440
10  348,29 1326,20 2601,11  11,3  4,0 0,4 11,3 4,0 0,4 16 39 88 20  110 470
Table 4: individual discounted total profit, minimum and maximum  
of discounted marginal profit (Lambda), depletion period and initial stocks 
  12The middle part of table 4 displays the quality of the simulation runs. The maximum and the 
minimum
13 of the discounted marginal profit indicate an acceptable approximation result. 
Varying the setting from a uniform distribution of initial stocks to a more and more 
concentrated stock allocation one might expect the following outcomes: 
  The higher the concentration the earlier player 1 and 2 leave the market 
  The higher the concentration the longer player 3 stays in the market 
  The higher the concentration the longer player 3 exists as a monopolist towards the 
end of the game 
  The higher a player’s share in initial total stock volume, the higher his discounted total 
profit 
  Given a particular share in initial total stock volume, the higher the concentration the 
higher the discounted total profit 
To give an intuition for some expectations from above one might argue from a static 
oligopoly situation:  
Usually, suppliers with higher production capacity or higher sales volume experience lower 
average- and marginal production costs, thus average margin and units sold are both higher, 
resulting in higher profits. 
Given a particular share in total industry capacity and an oligopoly with quantity setting 
enterprises, concentration and profits correlate positive. But this relationship might no longer 
exist in a competitive fringe situation. And it might even be erroneous in an oligopoly with 
price setters.  
Concerning expectations on extraction paths, a static model is useless. Thus, the first 
statement above is based on ‘gut instinct’. The second and third statement ground on the well 
known wisdom in resource management that a monopolist is a conserver of the exhaustible 
                                                 
13 Precisely, the maximum and the minimum for the discounted marginal profit of all periods with positive 
extraction quantity for the player under consideration at the end of a simulation run for a particular stock 
allocation. If maximum and minimum are equal even for the first decimal place, the simulation result was 
accepted as an approximation for the open-loop Nash equilibrium. 
  13resource. As in a static model his per period sales volume is lower than the total per period 
sales volume in perfect competition – at least at the beginning of the periods of examination. 
Coming back to table 4, a comparison of expectations and results is possible. First, extraction 
periods will be of interest. Next, discounted profits are under consideration – with a special 
glance at the influence of concentration on profits – and last but not least marginal discounted 
profits are going to be analysed. 
 
3.1 extraction periods 
As visible in picture 2, players ‘shrinking’ with increased concentration, leave the market 
earlier than before. In contrast, player 3 stays longer in the market. Therefore, his phase as 
monopolist extends. 
Who depletes the resource for how many periods?




































Picture 2: extraction periods related to the Herfindahl_index of initial stock 
allocation 
 
The monotonic relationship between monopolistic periods and the initial concentration in 
stock volume is presented in a condensed manner in picture 3: 
  14t_3-t_2 = number of periods with player 3 as monopolist 
towards the end of the game





























Picture 3: monopolistic periods related to the Herfindahl_index of initial stocks 
 
3.2 discounted profits 
Further, discounted profits, i.e. net present values (NPVs) of stock ownership, are presented in 
picture 4: 





























Picture 4: discounted profits related to allocation_ID 
  15First of all, the non-monotonic relationship between discounted total industry profit and 
concentration is ocular. Its causer is the way the allocation scenarios are constructed. For 
higher concentrated allocations, the expected monotonic relationship exists. 
Second, the strictly negative relationship between player 1’s profit and the concentration as 
well as the positive correlation between player 3’s profit and the concentration is striking. 
Player 2 has the most interesting part in the game. Although his share in total initial stock 
volume decreases, his position relative to player 1 becomes stronger and stronger. On the 
other side, he looses strength compared to player 3. Therefore his discounted profit is u-
formed in a plot against the concentration index; see picture 5 for a ‘view’ against the 
allocation_ID: 





















   
Picture 5: singled out profit of player 2 related to allocation_ID 
Even so player 2 owns a smaller share of the total stock volume in later allocation_IDs, his 
discounted profit increases.  
 
The design of the allocation setting allows to compare a particular share in total stock volume 
in different concentration situations. The available share/concentration combinations are 
depictured in the following table 5: 
 






30 32  34 
27  30 35 
23 28  37 
20  27 40 
17 25  43 
13  23 47 
10 22  52 
7  20 58 
Table 5: combinations of allocations with  
coincident share data 
A share of 30  % exists at a concentration of 34  % and of 35  %, a share of 27  % at a 
concentration of 35 % and of 40 % and so on. 
Evidently the discounted profit depends not only on the share in total stock volume but on the 










30 34  1311,92 
30 35  1219,86 
27 35  1162,80 
27 40  1204,06 
23 37  1109,05 
23 47  1214,39 
20 40  1045,59 
20 58  1268,59 
Table 6: combinations of allocations with 
coincident share data and the according discounted profit 
  17 
Concerning table 6, one can claim: the higher the concentration the higher the profit - given a 
fixed share - except for the first case (30 % share). To what extent this statement can be 
generalized has to be analysed be further investigations. The line of argumentation might go 
according to: the higher the concentration, the more the big player (player 3) behaves like a 
monopolist, the larger the residual demand in early periods, and therefore the higher the 
profits of the other players. 
 
3.3 marginal discounted profits 
Another aspect for further investigations is the effect of concentration to marginal discounted 
profit – given a fixed share in the initial stock volume. As displayed in table 4, different 
concentration values generate different marginal discounted profits – given a fixed share in 









30 34  1,6 
30 35  1,4 
27 35  1,5 
27 40  1,7 
23 37  1,9 
23 47  2,3 
20 40  2,3 
20 58  3,3 
Table 7: combinations of allocations with 
coincident share data and the according marginal discounted profit 
 
  18Again, the findings exclude the first case with the 30 % share. For the other three cases 
available, one can state: the higher the concentration the higher the marginal discounted profit 
- given a fixed share. As before, this indication is the one expected from capacity 
considerations in a static oligopoly model. Given a ‘fixed’ market size (here 600 units) and 
one big player (here player 3) with the tendency to behave like a monopolist, the residual 
demand remaining for the other players is comparatively large. Therefore their window of 
opportunity is large, too, resulting in higher marginal profits. As player 3 withholds a relevant 
fraction of his stock volume till the other players leave the market, the residual demand is 
even larger when one investigates early periods in an exhaustible resource game. Hence the 
positive effect of concentration on marginal discounted profits does not amaze.  




On the one side comparative statics show some anticipated findings, and on the other side 
they provide some surprising outcomes. Thus, more work in this direction is recommended. 
One way is to reply the simulations for different cost levels and different discount rates. This 
allows for a multidimensional comparative static analysis. First attempts with different cost 
levels approve the findings from the parameter settings in chapter 4.  
Given a sufficient number of parameter settings analysed, an econometrical examination 
becomes viable. It can discover the influence of stock size, concentration, costs and discount 
rate on the discounted profit. Additional interesting issues are the final period and the length 
of the monopoly phase. 
Further, to enlarge the number of players is desirable, but this extension is time-consuming 
and thus calls for a revised computer program.  
 
  19 
5 Conclusion 
In order to demonstrate students of non-mathematical faculties differential games in resource 
economics - without any mathematical training - a simple procedure in Excel was presented. 
Provided that concavity requirements are fulfilled, extraction stops within acceptable periods 
and the initial guess about the extraction paths is not too bad, the procedure approximates the 
Nash equilibrium. Furthermore, having an easy algorithm to calculating the equilibrium, 
comparative statics become viable. First results on comparative statics confirm some but not 
all expectations grounded on considerations in static models. More precisely, the connection 
between total industry profit and concentration might be partly reverse – depending on the 
manner concentration develops.  
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